Assessment of capacity to give informed consent for medical assistance in dying: a qualitative study of clinicians' experience.

BACKGROUND: Under the Canadian Criminal Code, medical assistance in dying (MAiD) requires that patients give informed consent and that their ability to consent is assessed by 2 clinicians. In this study, we intended to understand how Canadian clinicians assessed capacity in people requesting MAiD. METHODS: This qualitative study used interviews conducted between August 2019 and February 2020, by phone, video and email, to explore how clinicians assessed capacity in people requesting MAiD, what challenges they had encountered and what tools they used. The participants were recruited from provider mailing listserves of the Canadian Association of MAiD Assessors and Providers and Aide médicale à mourir. Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. The research team met to review transcripts and explore themes as they emerged in an iterative manner. We used abductive reasoning for thematic analysis and coding, and continued to discuss until we reached consensus. RESULTS: The 20 participants worked in 5 of 10 provinces across Canada, represented different specialties and had experience assessing a total of 2410 patients requesting MAiD. The main theme was that, for most assessments, the participants used the conversation about how the patient had come to choose MAiD to get the information they needed. When the participants used formal capacity assessment tools, this was mostly for meticulous documentation, and they rarely asked for psychiatric consults. The participants described how they approached assessing cases of nonverbal patients and other challenging cases, using techniques such as ensuring a quiet environment and adequate hearing aids, and using questions requiring only "yes" or "no" as an answer. INTERPRETATION: The participants were comfortable doing MAiD assessments and used their clinical judgment and experience to assess capacity in ways similar to other clinical practices. The findings of this study suggest that experienced MAiD assessors do not routinely require formal capacity assessments or tools to assess capacity in patients requesting MAiD.

Is there a place for CPR and sustained physiological support in brain-dead non-donors?

This article addresses whether cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and sustained physiological support should ever be permitted in individuals who are diagnosed as brain dead and who had held previously expressed moral or religious objections to the currently accepted criteria for such a determination. It contrasts how requests for care would normally be treated in cases involving a brain-dead individual with previously expressed wishes to donate and a similarly diagnosed individual with previously expressed beliefs that did not conform to a brain-based conception of death. The paper first focuses narrowly on requests for CPR and then expands its scope to address extended physiological support. It describes how refusing the brain-dead non-donor's requests for either CPR or extended support would represent enduring harm to the antemortem or previously autonomous individual by negating their beliefs and self-identity. The paper subsequently discusses potential implications of policy that would allow greater accommodations to those with conscientious objections to currently accepted brain-based death criteria, such as for cost, insurance, higher brain formulations and bedside communication. The conclusion is that granting wider latitude to personal conceptions around the definition of death, rather than forcing a contested definition on those with valid moral and religious objections, would benefit both individuals and society.

Physician-assisted dying and two senses of an incurable condition.

It is commonly accepted that voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide can be allowed, if at all, only in the cases of patients whose conditions are incurable. Yet, there are different understandings of when a patient's condition is incurable. In this article, I consider two understandings of the notion of an incurable condition that can be found in the recent debate on physician-assisted dying. According to one of them, a condition is incurable when it is known that there is no cure for it. According to the other, a condition is incurable when no cure is known to exist for it. I propose two criteria for assessing the conceptions and maintain that, in light of the criteria, the latter is more plausible than the former.

Perception of Value and the Minimally Conscious State.

The "disability paradox" is the idea that for those who become severely disabled, their own quality of life (QoL) assessment remains at or slightly below the QoL assessments of normal controls. This is a source of skepticism regarding third-person QoL judgments of the disabled. I argue here that this skepticism applies as well to those who are in the minimally conscious state (MCS). For rather simple means of sustaining an MCS patient's life (for example, tube feeding), the cost of being wrong that the patient would not want further support is high. Pair this cost with the reason to be skeptical of third-person judgments, and my argument suggests not withholding food and water from MCS patients.

Advance directives, dementia, and withholding food and water by mouth.

People with dementia who are no longer competent have limited control over how their lives end. But an advance directive to withhold food and water by mouth could be used to ensure that one does not live for years in severe dementia. Such directives are arguably already legal.

[Euthanasia and medical act]. / Eutanasia y acto médico.

Right to life -as the prohibition of intentionally and arbitrarily taking life, even with authorization of the concerned one- is an internationally recognized right. In many countries, debate regarding euthanasia is more centered in its convenience, social acceptability and how it is regulated, than in its substantial legitimacy. Some argue that euthanasia should be included as part of clinical practice of health professionals, grounded on individual's autonomy claims-everyone having the liberty to choose how to live and how to die. Against this, others sustain that life has a higher value than autonomy, exercising autonomy without respecting the right to life would become a serious moral and social problem. Likewise, euthanasia supporters some-times claim a 'right to live with dignity', which must be understood as a personal obligation, referred more to the ethical than to the strictly legal sphere. In countries where it is already legalized, euthanasia practice has extended to cases where it is not the patient who requests this but the family or some healthcare professional, or even the legal system-when they think that the patient is living in a condition which is not worthy to live. Generalization of euthanasia possibly will end in affecting those who need more care, such as elder, chronically ill or dying people, damaging severely personal basic rights. Nature, purpose and tradition of medicine rule out the practice of euthanasia, which ought not be considered a medical act or legitimately compulsory for physicians. Today's medicine counts with effective treatments for pain and suffering, such as palliative care, including sedative therapy, which best preserves persons dignity and keeps safe the ethos of the medical profession.

Egg cell preservation and the right to die in the Netherlands: citizens' choices and the limits of medicine.

It is a funny thing with the Dutch. On one hand, they seem preoccupied with death and adamant that patients be allowed to decide for themselves in what way they want to die. On the other, contrary to popular belief, the Dutch physician is allotted a very influential role in treatment decisions, far more prominent than in many other Western countries. From an American perspective Dutch professional ethics may seem quite paternalistic: a patient's freedom to decide to have a particular medical treatment is limited by the physician's professional assessment of the medical need of this treatment. The question arises: What is the relationship between the professional responsibility of Dutch physicians and the right of Dutch patients to decide for themselves? This question is illustrated by the ongoing national debate in The Netherlands on euthanasia and the growing demand for a further reaching right to self-determination concerning ending one's life. However, contrary to popular belief, not all Dutch ethical debate concerns end-of-life questions.

Do-not-resuscitate decisions in a large tertiary hospital: differences between wards and results of a hospital-wide intervention.

BACKGROUND: Despite the advent of palliative care, the quality of dying in the hospital remains poor. Differences in quality of end-of-life practice between hospital wards are well known in clinical practice but rarely have been investigated. METHODS: A prospective observation of do-not-resuscitate (DNR) decisions was conducted in patients dying in a Belgian university hospital before (115 patients) and after (113 patients) a hospital-wide intervention consisting in informing hospital staff on the law on Patient's Rights and the introduction of a new DNR form.The new DNR form puts more emphasis on the motivation of the DNR decision and on the description of the participants in the decision-making process. RESULTS: The completion of DNR forms improved after the intervention: physicians better documented who participated in DNR decisions (for participation of family: 63% after the intervention vs. 44% before the intervention, p = 0.022, for nurses: 27% vs. 14%, p = 0.047) and the motivation for these decisions (59% vs. 32%, p = 0.001). However, there was no difference in referral to the intensive care unit (ICU) at the end of life (in 40% of patients after and 37% before the intervention). Furthermore, the number of patients dying without DNR form on the wards was similar (13% and 8%). Surgical patients and patients with non-malignant diseases were more often referred to ICU at the end of life (71% in surgical vs. 35% in medical patients, p < 0.001 and 49% in patients with non-malignant diseases vs. 23% in patients with malignancy, p < 0.001). Moreover, surgical patients less frequently received a DNR order (56% in surgical vs. 92% in medical patients, p = 0.007). CONCLUSIONS: The introduction of a new DNR form and informing hospital staff on patients' right to information did not improve physicians' end-of-life practice.Transition from life-prolonging treatment to a more palliative approach was less anticipated in surgical patients and patients with non-malignant diseases.

Eutanasia y acto médico / Euthanasia and medical act

Right to life -as the prohibition of intentionally and arbitrarily taking life, even with authorization of the concerned one- is an internationally recognized right. In many countries, debate regarding euthanasia is more centered in its convenience, social acceptability and how it is regulated, than in its substantial legitimacy. Some argue that euthanasia should be included as part of clinical practice of health professionals, grounded on individual's autonomy claims-everyone having the liberty to choose how to live and how to die. Against this, others sustain that life has a higher value than autonomy, exercising autonomy without respecting the right to life would become a serious moral and social problem. Likewise, euthanasia supporters some-times claim a 'right to live with dignity', which must be understood as a personal obligation, referred more to the ethical than to the strictly legal sphere. In countries where it is already legalized, euthanasia practice has extended to cases where it is not the patient who requests this but the family or some healthcare professional, or even the legal system-when they think that the patient is living in a condition which is not worthy to live. Generalization of euthanasia possibly will end in affecting those who need more care, such as elder, chronically ill or dyingpeople, damaging severely personal basic rights. Nature, purpose and tradition of medicine rule out the practice of euthanasia, which ought not be considered a medical act or legitimately compul-sory for physicians. Today's medicine counts with effective treatments for pain and suffering, such as palliative care, including sedative therapy, which best preserves persons dignity and keeps safe the ethos of the medical profession.

The right to die in the minimally conscious state.

The right to die has for decades been recognised for persons in a vegetative state, but there remains controversy about ending life-sustaining medical treatment for persons in the minimally conscious state (MCS). The controversy is rooted in assumptions about the moral significance of consciousness, and the value of life for patients who are conscious and not terminally ill. This paper evaluates these assumptions in light of evidence that generates concerns about quality of life in the MCS. It is argued that surrogates should be permitted to make decisions to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment from patients in the MCS.